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CONTRACTS, COLLABORATION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION: FORGING 
RELATIONSHIPS IN THE FACE OF ADVERSITY 
ABSTRACT 
Contracts have traditionally been used to coordinate expectations and structure 
relations, with clients using them to define and manage commercial relationships with 
suppliers. Whilst extant literature is concerned with large capital projects of a ‘one-off’ 
nature, this research is concerned with individual contracts within ‘on-going’ strategic 
infrastructure maintenance programmes. Whereas relational contracting strategies are 
associated with better client-supplier relations, ‘on-going’ strategic infrastructure 
maintenance programmes tend not to use such contracts. This presents a problematic 
contextual backdrop for the successful delivery of such programmes.  
This research seeks to understand the conditions under which collaborative working 
arrangements can be achieved within non-collaborative commercial frameworks. An in-depth 
case study is used to explore collaboration within transactional lump-sum arrangements. The 
research reveals how the interpretation of a lump-sum contract led to the prioritisation of cost 
savings over quality and initially stimulated behaviours that inhibited collaboration. 
However, over time informal working practices and a collaborative working philosophy 
emerged reminiscent of that expected under relational contracts. Collaboration was 
established in an informal project culture that ran counter to a persistent adversarial 
commercial framework. Formal performance measures were resolved and performance 
appeared satisfactory to the client, even though it was enabled by informal working practices 
running counter to the client’s chosen contract. Contra much previous work that 
deterministically positions relationships as a product of the contract, this study reveals that 
collaborative behaviours can thrive even in unfavourable contractual conditions. This, in turn, 
calls for a re-theorisation of the relationship between contracts and behaviours within long-
term programme arrangements.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Major infrastructure schemes have received a great deal of attention in the project 
literature where it is largely concerned with large one-off projects such as Heathrow Terminal 
5 (Gil, 2009) and the 2012 London Olympics (Grabher and Thiel, 2015). Ongoing term 
maintenance contracts, on the other hand, receive rather less attention even though they 
present very different challenges. Specifically, ongoing strategic highway maintenance and 
renewal services must deal with the effects of short-term contracts within on-going 
programmes, geographically disparate teams and often the legacy of previous incumbents. 
One such example concerns strategic highway maintenance and renewal contracts which, in 
the UK, are divided by geographic area and procured via contracts of five years in length. At 
the end of the term, contracts are re-tendered the service provider usually changes. Contracts 
procured through competitive tender are awarded to the lowest price supplier, still the 
dominant selection criterion (Loosemore and Richard, 2015), with no guarantee of future 
work. Thus, a traditional, lump-sum contract approach is used to structure and govern a 
complex service delivery requiring close cooperation both between the client and supplier 
organisations and across the respective organisations.  
In this paper we examine the collaborative relations that emerge within contractual 
relationships when they are set up within traditional transactional contractual arrangements. 
These situations present an unusual situation whereby relational outcomes are required in the 
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face of contractual adversity, a situation that is poorly understood and theorised within the 
construction and project management literatures.  
Issues with Highways Maintenance and Renewal 
The client-supplier arrangement in the context of highway infrastructure maintenance 
and renewal necessitates inter-firm interactions at all stages of service and project delivery. 
Traditionally, contracts have coordinated expectations and have structured and governed the 
management of these relationships. Clients engage with suppliers using contractual forms 
structured around payment mechanisms including lump-sum, reimbursable, cost-plus and 
relational arrangements such as partnering and alliancing. According to transaction cost 
economics, pure market relationships facilitating competition are suited to occasional, 
standardised and simple transactions, in which assets may be fully specified (Regan et al., 
2015), whereas relational contracting, based on cooperation, is better for recurrent, complex 
and customised transactions (Eriksson, 2010b). The highly complex and customised supply 
of highways infrastructure requires projects of the latter type, even though they are procured 
under traditional transactional arrangements. A significant proportion of the services 
provided though infrastructure maintenance and renewal contracts are reactionary work to 
emerging defects on the strategic road network. Tensions are created when complex service 
provision requires deviation from patterns of activity set out in the contractual documents. 
Providers of strategic highway maintenance and renewal cannot at present intelligently 
predict potential road network failures. Where complexity and unpredictability make it 
difficult (or impossible) to define contractual contingencies for probable future events, 
activity must occur in a commercial environment of incomplete contracts (Pinto et al., 2009). 
Rather than concede to the challenges above actors must work with these constraints to 
achieve high social development, to enable less reliance on contractual control (Rose and 
Manley, 2012). 
Theoretical Importance of Collaboration and its Influence 
The benefits of a collaborative approach are widely accepted with a significant 
volume of research commenting on how to encourage and improve it (Yin et al., 2011, Austin 
et al., 2007, Ballard, 2000, Jorgensen and Emmitt, 2009, Marshall, 2014, Cox and Thompson, 
1997, Powell, 1998, Bresnen and Marshall, 2000). Research concerning collaboration has two 
foci: one concerned with the contractual mechanisms for coordinating inter-organisational 
relations and the other concerned with the sociological aspects of relational capability. These 
two views at times offer competing explanations of organisational collaboration (Powell, 
1998). This study considers these two foci in parallel to investigate how relational capability 
can be transplanted into informal, extra-contractual mechanisms to overcome the limitations 
of adversarial cost-based contracting. The analysis extends to examine the implications of 
common features of these types of arrangements, such as TUPE (Transfer of Undertakings 
(Protection of Employment) Regulations) rules protect employees' rights when the 
organisation or service they work for transfers to a new employer. This is particularly 
relevant in short term contracts within on-going maintenance programmes where employees 
transfer between organizations and bring with them an allegiance to the previous incumbents, 
but has not been considered in relation to its effect on contractual relations. This situation 
sees people with in depth knowledge of the geographical area working within a new 
organisational structure alongside people familiar with the organisation but new to the 
geographical locale. Such human resource topics lie at the heart of the issues at the interface 
between project-based firms and the projects (Winch, 2014).  
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THE CONTRACTUAL CONTINUUM 
The governance of an effective project network is driven by formal and informal 
means. Formal direction is provided by the contract, but informal direction is provided by 
important social factors (Rose and Manley, 2012). There is much research testifying to the 
complementary rather than substituting nature of contractual and relational governance 
(Poppo and Zenga, 2002, Lumineau and Henderson, 2012, Lu et al., 2015), highlighting the 
coordination function of contracts (Cao and Lumineau, 2015).  
Transactional Contracts 
Traditional procurement is the default option of government (Regan et al., 2015) and 
public sector clients continue to procure highway maintenance and renewal services under 
transactional forms of contract. Despite efforts over the last decade or so to move from 
adversarial and structural to more relational and collaborative approaches to the market 
(Smyth and Fitch, 2009), construction continues to be an industry characterised by a lack of 
trust and adversarial practices (Latham, 1994, Egan, 1998). Multiple layers of contractual 
agreements within single projects designed to protect the various stakeholders, are said to 
signal distrust between exchange partners and encourage opportunistic behaviour (Poppo and 
Zenga, 2002) and whereby the wrong individual attitudes ripples down through the team (Gil, 
2009). There is a preference within the UK construction industry for contractual compliance 
rather than collaborative working practices (Thompson et al., 1998).  Project quality has been 
defined as “the consistent conformance to customer expectations” (Basu, 2014, p.181), but it 
is argued that quality conformance only ensures conformance to standards; if the standards 
are not fit for purpose, getting things right first time will do nothing to reduce the 
performance gap or increase client satisfaction (Winch et al., 1998) and result only in the 
efficient production of something the customer does not need or want (Rother and Shook, 
1999). The preference for compliance over collaboration is beginning to change as clients 
become dissatisfied and collaborative benefits are more widely recognised. 
Relational Contracts 
Non-adversarial collaborative contract forms are rarer but receive considerable 
attention in academic debate (Gil, 2009, Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2005, Zou et al., 2014). 
Firms differ in their ability to do relational contracting (Powell, 1998). One party cannot 
impose a collaborative type of relationship upon the other; neither party can directly control 
the facets of the relationship on its own leading to a great deal of importance being placed 
upon the actions and intentions of both actors (Lamming et al., 1996, Vaaland, 2004, 
Dahlgren and Soderlund, 2001). And while the management of relationships cannot be 
legislated or purely contractual, its development depends on solid contractual underpinnings 
(Zou et al., 2014). Lumineau and Henderson  (2012) make and important distinction between 
contractual control governance and contractual coordination governance. Increasing 
contractual coordination governance significantly contributes to more cooperative negotiation 
strategies during a dispute between buyers and suppliers. Traditional contracts tend to control 
and relational contracts coordinate.  
Relational contracts that formalise collaborative working arrangements are designed 
to instil an ethos of cooperation amongst project teams from day one. It follows, therefore, 
that relational contracting arrangements are reported to result in higher quality team working 
leading to better project performance (Gil, 2009, Suprapto et al., 2015b). When steps are 
taken to foster a collaborative approach and a relational contracting strategy is chosen to 
encourage client-supplier cooperation in large infrastructure projects they are almost always a 
reactive response to client/market driven forces where behaviours are adjusted accordingly; 
they are not implemented as proactive strategic decisions to manage relationships (Smyth and 
Edkins, 2007).  
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Discussion in the literature tends to differentiate between relational and transactional 
contracting arrangements but little consideration is paid to the spectrum of interim contractual 
arrangements (Cox and Thompson, 1997). Sako (1992) cited in (Cox and Thompson, 1997) 
recognises the range of possible options and suggests there is a continuum between arms-
length contractual relations, typified by short term, one-off transactions where contractual 
defaults are addressed through legal action, through to obligation contractual relations 
typified by interdependency and goodwill where defaulting parties are quick to make amends 
in the spirit of trust.  Within highway maintenance and renewal, projects are divided by 
geographical area with suppliers supplying essentially the same service to different parts of 
the client organisation in different geographical areas whilst operating under different 
contractual arrangements. If and when at the end of a contract period a supplier successfully 
re-tenders to provide essentially the same service for a second term they may well be faced 
with a new and different contractual arrangement, further adding to the confusion. And this 
confusion only represents the adversarialism in tier one of the supply chain (Thompson et al., 
1998).  
Inappropriateness of Existing Methods of Contracting for Collaboration 
Traditional contracting arrangements, typified by strong confrontational interactions, 
are inappropriate for collaborative working arrangements (Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 
2005) and counteract the development of trust (Kadefors cited in Pinto et al., (2009)). There 
is evidence to suggest that the relationship is what governs and the contract is merely 
complementary and therefore changing the contract without addressing the relations and 
behaviours will have little or no effect (Thompson et al., 1998). In the same vein, there is a 
willingness within the construction industry to implement collaborative approaches to 
working relationships but the application is not profound. Solutions to major problems are 
often ad hoc ‘bolt-on’ elements (Anvuur and Kumaraswamy, 2008).  Firms often show 
willing to experiment with a suite of tools and techniques but are either unwilling or unable to 
instil a culture of collaboration (Boyce et al., 2012) with the potential impact of team building 
hindered by the ‘formalisation’ of collaborative practices (Suprapto et al., 2015a p1357). 
Without re-engineering all elements of the contractual relations, relational contracts 
implemented on a project by project basis are little more than tokenism (Cox and Thompson, 
1997). Unlike one-off capital infrastructure projects, ongoing programmes of infrastructure 
maintenance procured via one-off contracts (examples of which are almost completely absent 
in current literature, see Thompson et al., (1998)) in theory provides the unusual opportunity 
to learn from previous contracts and apply innovations to subsequent contracts that are 
contextually the same. But evidence to show this systematically occurring is absent. The 
relationships developed and learning acquired are constrained to the discrete duration and 
geographical locale of the contract. Evidence of firms going beyond a project by project 
approach towards a behavioural approach is piecemeal (Smyth and Fitch, 2007, Gadde and 
Dubois, 2010). 
The Role of Relationships in Managing Uncertainty 
Clients planning to implement cooperative relationships need to reassess their entire 
procurement process in order to facilitate trust and cooperation with contractors (Eriksson 
and Pesamaa, 2007). Smyth & Edkins (2007) call for greater consideration to be given to the 
proactive management of relationships to foster collaborative working. Relevant to the 
provision of highway maintenance and renewal is that the public sector is particularly weak 
in consistently managing the interface with the private sector (Smyth and Edkins, 2007).  In a 
traditionally contractual operating environment, a mismatch of value interpretation resulting 
in a failure to deliver the promises set out signals contractual noncompliance thereby creating 
tension and conflict between supplier and client. Where change is likely, changes that have 
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not been provided for in the contract, a greater reliance on established relationships is needed 
to maintain the contractual bond (Zou et al., 2014). This study seeks to understand the 
conditions under which collaborative working relationships can be achieved within what are 
seemingly non-collaborative commercial frameworks.  
METHODS 
The study is based on a single case, chosen as the best method to collect data to 
support the argument through an in-depth examination of a private sector organisation 
providing public sector infrastructure maintenance and renewal services. The case study 
contract under investigation is a bespoke form of lump-sum contract designed to deliver 
services in a particular geographic locale in the UK for 5 years. Before this contract began, 
the maintenance and renewal services for this area had been provided by a different supplier 
under a cost reimbursable form of contract.  
Data was collected through participant observation over the course of seven months. 
A constructivist approach was taken as it recognises that concepts and theoretical level of 
analysis emerge from the researcher’s interaction with the field (Bryman and Bell, 2011). The 
researcher is an embedded observer of practice within the supplier organisation and adopted 
an action research approach (McNiff, 2002) (although in this case the change observed was 
initiated by the organisation and not the researcher) in order to provide a rich description and 
for revealing the impact of contract type on inter-firm cooperation in the under researched 
context of strategic infrastructure maintenance and renewal and how the introduction of 
relational principles over time affects project delivery. Observations focused on a series of 
workshops, a key element of a contract-wide improvement plan designed to bring together 
key actors of the supplier and client organisation to debate and agree the greatest problems 
threatening project delivery, identify the root causes of the problems and formulate proposed 
solutions. These workshops were facilitated to encourage open and frank “off the record” 
discussions. The proposed solutions were later presented to a panel of judges made up of both 
client and supplier representatives who had to agree that positive change would result from 
the actions suggested. The workshops were the forum where people came together and the 
evolution of relations took place allowing for rich data to be gathered.  
The observations were supplemented with seven face-to-face unstructured interviews 
lasting between 60 and 90 minutes. The interviews sample universe consisted of key project 
team members within the supplier and client organisation including four senior members of 
the delivery team (two from the client organisation and two from the supplier) one project 
engineer (supplier organisation) and two business improvement managers (one from the 
supplier organisation and one consultant) working directly on the case study project. 
Convenience sampling (Robinson, 2014) was employed to identify participants. Data was 
supplemented with analysis of company documents, produced predominantly as outcomes of 
workshops. The unstructured interviews were audio recorded and transcribed verbatim for 
analysis. The interview transcripts were thematically coded and abstractions were made. The 
analysis focused on emerging themes from the data for a qualitative interpretation. The 
literature review provided concepts to look for, but the main purpose of the unstructured 
approach to interviewing was to allow the participants to focus on what they felt was 
important.  
THEORETICAL MODEL 
In Figure 1 we set out a model which offers an alternative concept to the relational 
and transactional contract dichotomy and suggests that rather than being substitutes in terms 
of their impact on outcomes, relational behaviour can flourish within unfavourable 
transactional contractual conditions. 
Proceedings – EPOC 2016 Conference 
6 
 
Figure 1: Theoretical positions of relationships in the Behaviour / Contract matrix 
 
The argument communicated through this model is that relational behaviour can be 
realised when transactional, typically adversarial, forms of contract are used which we call 
developmental relationships. These relationships occur when a collaborative approach is 
required but when the procurement strategy does not specify such an approach. In the 
transactional quadrant there is little need or desire to be collaborative, typical for the 
procurement of simple and standardised good and services (Eriksson, 2010a). The relational 
quadrant requires and enables high level of collaboration as typified by relational contracting 
strategies. The opportunistic quadrant is where a relational form of contract is employed but 
opportunistic behaviour is enacted and there are examples in literature of this in the lower 
tiers of the supply chain within projects using relational contracts (Gil, 2009 p.163, Bresnen 
and Marshall, 2000 p.827). Contra to previous work that positions relationships as a product 
of the formal contractual documentation, this study reveals that collaborative behaviours can 
thrive even in unfavourable contractual conditions. These findings support prior research that 
claims contractual and relational governance can complement one another (Lu et al., 2015, Yi 
et al., 2009, Poppo and Zenga, 2002) but furthermore, we reveal that relational and 
collaborative behaviours emerged from adversarial contractual conditions suggesting that the 
notion of formal contract documents locking projects in to one mode of behaviour is flawed 
and the position of projects within the matrix can move along either axis during execution.    
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Inhibitors of Collaboration 
Cost Before Quality 
The delivery of highway maintenance services to a public sector client by a private 
service provider requires the bringing together of two main parties that have different 
commercial and/or social objectives. It is the interest of the private sector to receive payments 
and it is the public sector interest to provide the essentials for the fabric of society (Ball et al., 
2014). Ingrained within the public sector is a requirement to demonstrate best value and it is 
believed that the best way to ensure accountability and auditability in the safeguarding of 
public funds is to document it in contractual forms and manage it by way of dedicated 
management information systems designed to provide transparency (Dowling et al., 2008). 
When set against a backdrop of economic austerity and Government drives for cost savings, 
the chosen approach of the client was to utilise a low cost lump-sum form of contract to 
procure the services required. According to interviewees, this lead to the focus of the 
relationship being contractual rather than relational and the relationship quickly became 
adversarial when contractual compliance was employed as the preferred method to govern the 
delivery of services.  
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Payment Mechanisms  
The payment mechanisms of the reimbursable contracts delivered by a previous 
supplier were felt by interviewees within the client’s senior delivery team to have encouraged 
a more collaborative approach and provide a foundation for positive relationships unlike 
those experienced under the current lump-sum arrangement. The budget for the lump-sum 
form of contract was much reduced compared to the previous cost reimbursable arrangement 
and this is reported to have driven behaviour within the supplier organisation that the client 
will get no more than has been paid for and the contract will be the tool used to enforce and 
control that approach. Clients need to be more wary of equating low price with good value 
(Loosemore and Richard, 2015). Interviews with the client organisation revealed that the 
lump-sum arrangement gave them the feeling of battling to achieve more than “a bare 
minimum design” from a supplier whose aim was understood to be not to breech the design 
fee set out in the contract.  
Contract Interpretation  
Interviewees mentioned that the interpretation of previous contracts was mutually 
well established whereas the new lump-sum contract was less well understood. As service 
delivery commenced it was soon felt that the contract left many areas of delivery open to 
interpretation as delivery moved away from a technically prescribed approach, as in previous 
contracts, to a less specific, risk-based approach. Interviewees said that contracts work better 
when parties collaborative to the ethos of the contract rather than to the letter of it, indicating 
that incomplete contracts require collaborative working relationships to be able to jointly 
navigate the grey areas and mitigate the incompleteness. However this was not the stance 
taken at the outset. The behaviour exhibited by senior management at the start of the contract 
was reported to be “military like”, showed favouritism, was played “straight down the line”, 
and was blunt “to the point of rudeness”. This stance is reported by an interviewee to have 
massively exacerbated the problems on both sides as supplier and client went head-to-head 
rather than collaboratively working through the tensions. These comments resonate with 
literature highlighting a reliance on the skill and personality of team members for success 
(Kovacic and Filzmoser, 2014).  
Contractual letters are said to have proliferated like confetti. Formal communications 
making reference to contractual clauses were felt to further drive a wedge between the two 
parties rather than encourage collaborative resolution to issues that were often felt to be 
minor, consistent with prior research (Lumineau and Henderson, 2012). Such a mismatch 
between applications of the contract between parties generates conflict, degrades cooperation 
and leads to disputes and trust deterioration (Cao and Lumineau, 2015). For the case study 
organisations, much of the adversity experienced centres on the (mis-) interpretation of the 
commercial aspects of the contract at project mobilisation and as the project was delivered. 
When uncertainty is high, the early post-contractual phase is of special importance in public 
projects. After signing the contract, a process will start where both parties jointly make sense 
of the relationship both contractually and behaviourally and how this is handled decides how 
the relationship develops (Dewulf and Kadefors, 2012). Early contractual control governance 
significantly contributed to a less cooperative negotiation strategy (Lumineau and Henderson, 
2012).   
Interviewees felt the contract to be inappropriate and that it failed to provide a robust 
platform to work from, signalling that contractual compliance does not necessarily result in a 
quality service if the contract is not fit-for-purpose. The misinterpretation of the commercial 
aspects of the contract affected multiple areas of the project delivery. One interviewee 
commented that the best designs with the best project delivery teams will not be delivered if 
commercially the price cannot be agreed. Project teams on both the supplier and client side 
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felt powerless to influence the commercial aspects of the contract which further eroded the 
already tenuous relationships.   
Recognition of Failings 
Eighteen months into contract delivery and the issue of a formal notice to terminate 
was the point at which executive management recognised the seriousness of the issues facing 
the contract, although conspicuous signs of failure were present beforehand. The number of 
“points” awarded by the client to supplier for contractual non-compliance escalated 
significantly in the months leading up to the issue of the formal notice. Prior to this the 
supplier had made one-sided, isolated efforts to affect positive change but widespread 
improvement action was not taken until after the client threatened contract termination.  
In the aftermath of the formal notice the supplier and client jointly embarked on a 
contract-wide improvement plan. During a series of collaborative workshops the root of all 
problems was identified to have originated prior to contract delivery during the 6 month 
contract mobilisation stage where is now recognised that the contract requirements were not 
fully understood.  
Whilst the road to failure was compounded by the lump-sum transactional 
arrangements that allowed uncooperative behaviours to entrench and act as blockers to 
collaborative, open, honest and trusting relationships, in the face of adversity, collaborative 
approaches more akin to partnering forms of contract were transplanted into project delivery. 
This collaborative approach disclosed conflicts in the relationship by mutually understanding 
and removing uncertainty about events and issues threatening the project. A lot of the issues 
that had been aggravating project delivery were brought to the fore. The improvement plans 
facilitated an understanding of the other party’s concerns and uncovered the underlying 
causes of tension in the relationship. By stimulating openness in this way it became easier to 
communicate across the organisation boundary and compromise on disputed areas. Following 
the step-change brought about by the improvement plan, which saw highly collaborative 
working practices transplanted into an adversarial project environment, the formal notice 
issued by the client was lifted.  
These findings provide insights into how the interpretation of lump-sum forms of 
contracts can lead to the prioritisation of cost savings over quality and drive behaviours that 
inhibit collaboration, resulting in failure to deliver quality services. ‘Rather than be a 
mechanism to unite buyer and supplier in a common cause (i.e. to construct the works), the 
contract was being used as a wedge to drive distance between them’ (Thompson et al., 1998 
p36). Whilst in the case study examined here the transactional lump-sum contract represents a 
wedge between the parties, it is argued that it is being driven in by the confrontational and 
adversarial behaviours displayed by senior management and emulated by members within the 
project teams. Rather than substitute the lump-sum contractual wedge for a relational contract 
that would, in theory, facilitate unity through a collaborative approach to delivery, the 
findings here suggest that a transactional contract and a relational approach to delivery are 
not mutually exclusive, as depicted in Figure 1 and it is possible to move between quadrants 
during the lifecycle of a project. This proposition builds further on prior research which 
discusses the complementary natural of contractual and relational governance (Lumineau and 
Henderson, 2012, Cox and Thompson, 1997, Yi et al., 2009) by revealing the conditions 
under which contractual governance can shift from a controlling to a coordinating function. 
Whilst a transactional, traditionally arm’s length contract may not be the optimum 
contracting strategy according to (Thompson et al., 1998), it is possible to have relationality 
through transaction. What is not clear at this stage of the research is the cause of the shift 
within the contract/behaviour matrix during project execution towards more collaborative 
working relationships. We can speculate that a desire within both the supplier and client 
organisation to ensure the safety of the road network prompted a shift in the matrix from the 
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transactional quadrant to the developmental quadrant as a way to move beyond the impasse 
created by the incompleteness and misinterpretation of the contract documentation. Conflicts, 
if settled successfully lead to an integration of different perspectives and therefore better 
results (Kovacic and Filzmoser, 2014). The contract wide improvement project discussed is a 
clear example of this in practice. Furthermore, the findings support research that states an 
ability to enact quality inter-firm cooperation influences project performance more than the 
contracting arrangements and that relational attitudes and team working quality have the 
ability to mediate the effects of contract types (Suprapto et al., 2015b).  
Findings here support the stance that many clients lack the insight and tools to take a 
leadership role and are unwilling and unable to employ strategies to foster better performance 
because of internal governance constraints (Loosemore and Richard, 2015). Mechanisms of 
contractual governance and sanctions in the place of relational collaboration and joint 
problem solving are giving project delivery teams’ extensive problems. Considerable effort 
has been spent on reversing the negative effects of a highly contractual approach that was 
allowed, at the outset, through adversarial behaviours, to push project delivery to breaking 
point.  
Interviews revealed that the need to work together to build strong working 
relationships is recognised throughout both the supplier and client organisation but is often 
overlooked in favour of technical capabilities. The adversarial behaviour exhibited by senior 
members of the project team continued unchecked because their engineering credentials took 
precedent.  The culture to collaborate must be led by and demonstrated by the senior team but 
requires strategic and systematic application to avoid the pitfalls of emulating the adversarial 
behaviours displayed by a few individuals. As experienced across much of the construction 
and civil engineering industry, the case study organisation has failed to apply learning from 
previous projects with favourable working relationships. The peculiarities of on-going 
programmes of highway maintenance and renewal provides the client with learning 
opportunities, and the TUPE regulations provides the supplier with the opportunity to harness 
knowledge acquired on previous contracts. Instead of embracing these factors as sources of 
relational advantage, they have been cited as the causes of adversity.  
The ability of the project teams to affect positive change following a near terminal 
chain of events demonstrates that the quality of cooperation affects performance more than 
the contractual arrangement. Collaborative behaviour has been proven to take hold in 
unfavourable, contractually adversarial conditions. The findings presented run counter to 
existing literature which asserts a continuum between transactional and relational contractual 
arrangements and therefore calls for a re-theorisation of the relationship between contracts 
and behaviours within long term project arrangements in so far as collaborative relationships 
can prosper without relational contractual arrangements. Furthermore, the position of 
relationships within the matrix in figure 1 can shift when a situation necessitating 
collaboration overrides the contractually defined relationships. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This research contributes to literature on project contracting and collaboration through 
a consideration of the peculiarities of one-off contracts within a programme of on-going 
infrastructure maintenance and renewal. Clients tend to procure work under transactional 
contracts despite the high levels of inter-organisational cooperation required. This study has 
found that under adversarial conditions, collaborative working relationships can develop over 
time despite an underlying lump-sum transactional contractual arrangement. This has 
implications for the understanding of how contracting practices impact the social ties between 
actors executing intra- and inter-firm working. The research provides insights that will help 
clients and suppliers of ongoing infrastructure maintenance recognise potential sources of 
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adversity when opting to use non-partnering forms of contract to facilitate projects that 
require high levels of inter-organisational transactions. This contributes to theory with the 
offer of a new perspective on collaborative working arrangements when procurement 
arrangements are highly contractual (see Figure 1) demonstrating that collaborative 
relationships can be encouraged to emerge whilst operating traditionally arms-length 
transactional contract.  
 This study supports the notion that what matters to project performance more than the 
form of contract is the ability to develop collaborative attitudes but further research is 
required to understand why projects procured under transactional contract arrangements are 
able to shift within the contract/behaviour matrix during project execution. What are the 
factors that cause such a shift and what the likely implications for the delivery of highway 
maintenance projects. Practically, the findings suggest the need for an assessment of the 
preparedness of an organisation to enact a collaborative working arrangement, particularly 
when undertaking work that clients continue to procure under lump-sum forms of contract, 
and how to operationalise the collaborative working practices before adversity forces action.  
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